By J. Michael Waller
While President Obama is conferring with Russian President Vladimir
Putin at the G-20 economic summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, current and
retired senior American intelligence officials fear he is blind to a
growing threat from a resurgent Russia.
These officials say that
Moscow continues to probe America's skies and seas with bombers and
submarines, both to assert itself and to see just how far Russia can
push Obama. In June 2012, Russian strategic nuclear bombers broke
protocol and conducted maneuvers in the Arctic without alerting the U.S.
A
month later a Russian Tu-95 Bear-H strategic bomber, capable of
carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles, entered American airspace off
Alaska and California. Then in August, a stealthy Russian Akula-class
attack submarine, designed to hunt and sink American subs, patrolled for
weeks off Texas, Louisiana and Florida.
Intelligence officials
have raised a litany of concerns about Russian behavior that, when taken
together, form what they see as an alarming pattern:
Aggressive spying on the U.S. and allied governments at Cold War levels;
Systematic
espionage, including ultrasophisticated cybercampaigns, against private
businesses to steal their proprietary information;
Accelerated
strategic weapons modernization to enhance the ability to blackmail the
U.S. and its allies with thermonuclear destruction.
Despite its
own sagging economy and massive U.S. defense cuts, Russia is upgrading
its Soviet-era weapons and building new systems superior to America's.
At the sprawling Sevmash shipyards in the Arctic port of Severodvinsk,
Russian workers are busy building the world's most advanced nuclear
missile-firing, Borei-class submarines. To the south, at the Votkinsk
Machine Building Plant in Russia's Udmurt Republic, technicians assemble
Bulava ballistic missiles to be launched from those subs. Their
purpose: to deliver high-tech thermonuclear warheads to incinerate
American cities.
The Borei-class submarines will be armed with
between 16 and 20 of the latest Bulava missiles, each capable of
carrying between six and 10 nuclear warheads.
"The one thing that
keeps Russians in the big boys' club is their strategic nuclear force,"
former CIA director Michael Hayden told American Media Institute. "It's
not at all surprising that's something that continues to receive
investment."
"The president has to communicate to the Russians
that he's tougher than he appears to be in public," argues Robert W.
Stephan, a former 20-year CIA veteran.
Instead, the Russians see a pattern of weakness under Obama, analysts say.
As
president, Obama has sought to reassure the Russians on many fronts.
Unilaterally, he has slashed the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons arsenal.
He has pulled the plug on anti-ballistic missile systems for Poland and the Czech Republic.
His defense budget has plummeted since the last year of the Bush administration.
Still
the Russians want more. Following a 90-minute closed-door Obama meeting
with Putin's stand-in president, Dmitry Medvedev, in March 2012, an
ABC-TV microphone picked up Obama pleading: "This is my last election.
After my election, I have more flexibility."
Replied Medvedev: "I understand. I will transmit this to Vladimir."
Moscow's real push forward began with Obama's first election in 2008.
"Moscow
is now setting its sights on long-term challenges of rearmament and
professionalization," says the nation's top intelligence officer,
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. "In 2010, a 10-year
procurement plan was approved to replace Soviet-era hardware and bolster
deterrence with a balanced set of modern conventional, asymmetric, and
nuclear capabilities."
Few expected Obama to raise
concerns about Russia's intensive nuclear weapons drive with Putin, the
summit host. Obama recently canceled a one-on-one meeting with the
Russian leader to protest Moscow's granting asylum to intelligence
defector Edward Snowden.
But Obama's back-and-forth vacillating on
Syria, a Russian ally, is "very dangerous, because misreading American
intentions and capabilities may invite accidents," says Herman Pirchner,
president of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington.
"Provocative
weakness" is how analysts describe Obama's foreign policy. "Provocative
weakness is a state in which you look weak, and you inadvertently
provoke Russia, and others who mean you ill, into thinking they can grab
something for nothing," says Pirchner, who has made scores of visits to
Russia for meetings with officials and who has hosted hundreds of
Russian representatives in Washington.
By not making an issue of
Russian espionage, the U.S. is costing American companies their
competitive edge and their bottom line, agree a wide variety of experts.
"Our
corporations and businesses are easy victims," says S. Eugene Poteat, a
former CIA officer and president of the Association of Former
Intelligence Officers (AFIO). "The U.S. has been, and still is, the most
spied-on nation in the world, because we are the greatest source of
high technology R&D and intellectual property."
Obama should
press Putin on the issue, former CIA Director Michael Hayden believes.
"When they're stealing money or private intellectual property, that's
not accepted international practice. We have a right to be angry, and to
hold Russia to certain standards of behavior."
"All states
conduct espionage," says Hayden. "But what we see in Russia is an awful
lot of cyberespionage done by what I would call hired guns, criminal
gangs."
Director of National Intelligence Clapper has been vocal in warning Congress.
In
testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Clapper
equated Russian espionage against the U.S. with international organized
crime and terrorism, "undermining our economic and technological
advantages, and seeking to influence our national policies and processes
covertly."
"Cybercriminals are determined to prey not only on
individual bank accounts, but on the financial system itself," New
York-based U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said when announcing the
indictments of two Russians awaiting trial for hacking into large U.S.
banks and the NASDAQ.
U.S. prosecutors did not allege that the
hackers were tied to the Russian government. Yet Bharara's aggressive
work against the cybercriminals so offended the Putin regime that
earlier this year it formally banned the federal prosecutor from
visiting Russia.
After years of resisting the idea that the
Russian intelligence services were a part of the international organized
crime problem, U.S. intelligence has since concluded that the threat is
real. Clapper told the Senate in March, "In Russia, the nexus among
organized crime, some state officials, the intelligence services, and
business blurs the distinction between state policy and private gain."
Eleven
alleged members of a Texas-based procurement network for Russian
military and intelligence services are awaiting trial in New York for
having illegally exported $50 million worth of top-secret U.S.
microelectronics for the Russian military and spy services.
According
to the FBI, the microelectronics are critical to "a wide range of
military systems, including radar and surveillance systems, weapons
guidance systems, and detonation triggers."
Few of either party,
in the White House or on Capitol Hill, have shown much concern as Russia
has progressively replaced its aging Soviet nuclear arsenal with
state-of-the-art systems. Obama should alert the public to Russian
strategic nuclear modernization, former senior officials argue.
"It
flies in the face of our president's very deeply felt commitment to
move toward a nuclear-free world," says Hayden. "Here we have the Cold
War adversary ... trying to modernize their strategic weapons. "
Moscow
built loopholes into new arms-control treaties while developing weapons
systems to exploit those openings that escaped U.S. scrutiny. One
example: Mobile ICBMs based on railroads were banned under the bilateral
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, but when START expired in 2010, the
Russian military was already developing a new, rail-based ICBM that will
be legally deployable under the New START treaty, which went into force
in 2011. The Obama administration did not formally object to the new
Russian weapons.
"The Kremlin sees arms control treaties as a
means of locking in its technological superiority and hamstringing the
United States," says former CIA officer Stephan.
Russia has the
world's most sophisticated strategic nuclear missile force. It has
completed its deployments of the SS-25 Topol and SS-27 Topol-M ICBMs,
with versions in fixed silos and on hard-to-target mobile vehicles.
It
is now deploying the next-generation SS-29, with carbon filament
fuselages and fast-burning solid fuels that make them difficult to
detect when launched, low ballistic trajectories that make them hard to
spot when in flight, and with multiple warheads that can take
independent evasive action against present and planned U.S. missile
defense systems.
Russia's new-generation submarines can launch
missiles at the continental U.S. while submerged and moving, making them
very difficult targets for the U.S. to detect and counter. When all
eight planned Borei-class submarines are deployed, they will carry a
total of up to 1,600 nuclear warheads, all designed to evade American
ballistic missile defense systems.
The main concern with Russia's
nuclear modernization is not that Moscow will attack the United States,
but that it will use its nuclear superiority and negative diplomacy to
bend the U.S. to its will - or at least prevent the U.S. from defending
its interests and allies.
An internal House Armed Services
Committee staff memo voices concern that "for the first time in seven
decades, allies and adversaries will question our ability to provide a
nuclear response to an attack," making the value of U.S. deterrence
strategy useless or, in the case of provocative weakness, dangerously
inviting to a potential aggressor or miscalculation.
Russia-watchers
are concerned that, by failing to provide tough-minded clarity,
President Obama could inadvertently be provoking a fantasy-driven
Kremlin.
"Our nation wouldn't risk getting into such trouble if
the president made credible statements about vital U.S. interests," says
Pirchner. "Now the credibility of Obama is not what it should be to
give American diplomacy maximum leverage."
J. Michael Waller is a
senior writer at the American Media Institute and a former adviser to
U.S. intelligence agencies and U.S. Special Operations Command.
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